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Digital security

I help journalists, NGOs, legal teams and individuals reduce what can be learned about them and harden the devices and accounts they rely on. Every engagement starts with a threat model: who might want what, and what it would cost them to get it.

Threat modelling

The first conversation maps who might take an interest in you or your organisation, what they would want, what they can already reach and what it would cost them to get more. The answers decide which of the work below is worth doing and in what order: a newsroom handling sources and a family business worried about its public profile need different things.

After that conversation I set out the scope in writing: what I will look at, what I will change or recommend, and what stays outside the engagement. The work starts once you have agreed it.

Footprint audit and reduction

A footprint audit looks at what anyone can find about you or your organisation from public sources: registry entries, old profiles, data-broker listings, metadata in published documents, photos that show more than intended. I then work through what can be removed, corrected or made harder to find, starting with what the threat model says matters most.

Footprint work covers your own exposure or your organisation’s, with your consent, and never third parties. I don’t run it on a partner, an employee or anyone else on your behalf.

Communications, accounts and devices

Most exposure runs through a handful of accounts and the phone. I review how messaging and email are set up, account recovery and two-factor settings, hardware keys, password management and the devices themselves, then harden them in the order the threat model sets.

Before travel, I help prepare laptops and phones so that less is on them and what is there is harder to reach: which device to take, what to back up and remove first, what to leave at home. This covers devices and data; routes, accommodation and personal safety are outside it.

Data and document handling for teams

For newsrooms, NGOs and legal teams, I look at how documents and source material move: where they arrive, who can open them, how matters or stories are kept apart and what is deleted when.

The result is a set of changes to how your existing tools are configured and a short written procedure your team can follow. I cover how the tools are set up; what a bar rule, a conduct rule or a newsroom policy requires stays with the people who answer for it.

My own setup

For sensitive work I run language models locally on my own hardware, use self-hosted services where a hosted one would see the material, and work on hardened devices and communications. Some of the tools I use I built myself.

I hold no security certifications. I have done this work for individuals and groups; I don’t describe it.

Private by design

The systems I build follow the same rules: local-first where the material is sensitive, models on your own hardware where that is possible, and no client data sent to a third party unless you have agreed to it in writing.

Private by design on the Systems page

What this is not

This practice does not cover:

  • Incident response for an active compromise.
  • Device forensics for court.
  • Physical security.
  • Sweeps for surveillance equipment.
  • Protection of persons.
  • Penetration testing.

If a device or account of yours is under attack now, contact the Access Now Digital Security Helpline. It is free for civil society and answers around the clock.

See my principles

First contact

I keep one Signal account, and its username is not published here. To get it, give me your name, an email address and what the contact is about in one line. I send a link to that address. It works for one hour and shows my current username.

I change the username from time to time, so a copy that ends up elsewhere stops leading to me. Chats already started keep working after a change. The link carries your address encrypted, and the email to you contains a short fixed note and the link, nothing you typed.

In a first message, leave out:

  • Names of sources or of people at risk
  • Documents, files or screenshots
  • Details of an incident or of the threat

Say who you are, how I can reach you and roughly what the work is. The detail can follow once the scope is agreed.

A first conversation

Tell me who is involved and which devices and accounts you rely on, and keep the first message general. I reply with a time to talk, and the scope is agreed in writing after that conversation.